The Hackening

Research notes

Background notes compiled from community discussion and public reporting, behind the first version of this site. They are not recommendations. The estimates are judgment calls, not forecasts; read them as a rough ranking, not precise numbers.

These are background notes, not recommendations. They were compiled from community discussion and public reporting in October–November 2026, with the help of an AI agent, and have not been checked by a professional. The estimates are judgment calls, not forecasts; read them as a rough ranking, not precise numbers.

How a hostile internet hits money

Four different failure modes, each needing a different defense. Deposit insurance and gold each protect against the wrong one.

Failure mode What breaks What protects
Someone takes over your accounts Money moved out through your login (phishing, SIM swap, breached data, stolen session, or a support call impersonating you) Unique passwords, non-SMS two-factor, credit freezes, alerts; legal refund rules (Reg E) and broker guarantees
Your institution is down or frozen Money is safe but unreachable for days to weeks A second and third institution on different systems, plus cash
Regional or payment-network outage Cards and ATMs stop working Physical cash and supplies
An institution's records are damaged, or it fails Proof of what you own FDIC/NCUA/SIPC, the institution's offline backups, your own statements

Gold only helps in a fifth case, a collapse of the dollar system, which is far less likely than any of these.

Why mass events change the picture. Insurance pools losses that don't happen at the same time. SIPC's fund targets $5 billion plus a $2.5 billion Treasury credit line, against trillions in brokerage assets. In a mass event, the real backstop is political, so being a typical victim at a large institution holding plain assets is safer than being an unusual one ("defense by normality"). SVB's deposits were guaranteed within a weekend in 2023; customers of finance apps built on Synapse were locked out for months, and some never got all their money back.

The authorized/unauthorized line. Under Regulation E, a transfer someone else makes with your stolen or phished credentials is unauthorized. If a thief used your card or another access device, report within 2 business days of finding out and you owe at most $50; wait longer and it can rise to $500. If no access device was used, you owe nothing as long as you report within 60 days of the statement. After 60 days, later losses may not be refunded at all. (Whether a stolen login counts as an access device was not checked against the regulation's definitions, so report at once either way.) The bank must investigate within 10 business days or provisionally credit you, and the bank carries the burden of proof. A payment you initiate yourself, even because of a scam, stays authorized. Activity by someone you gave access to (including an agent or budgeting app) generally counts as authorized; Fidelity's guarantee says so explicitly.

How long outages last

Started Event Duration
Jun 2024 Patelco Credit Union ransomware About two weeks without online banking, app, transfers or call center
Jun 2024 CDK Global (software for ~15,000 car dealers) About two weeks, restored in phases
Nov 2023 Trellance / Ongoing Operations vendor ransomware About 60 credit unions out for days to weeks
Apr 2024 Synapse collapse (not a hack) Months frozen; some customers never got all their money back

What sets the length. Patching takes days. Most of the outage is the institution proving its systems are clean before reconnecting, and it's largely self-imposed: institutions shut services down to contain the damage. Length depends on what attackers did inside:

When many institutions are hit at once (a flaw in software they share), restoration becomes a queue, and cleanup specialists are spread across every victim. Institutions late in the queue could plausibly be out three to six weeks. That's an extrapolation, not a precedent. Small banks and credit unions mostly rent core systems from a few vendors, so they're more exposed to a shared flaw than large banks running their own systems.

What mass-event support looks like. Rent, loans, utilities and late fees tend to get deferred within days. Food, gas and medicine can't be deferred, so cash only needs to cover those until payment systems come back.

Scenario estimates (as of late Oct 2026)

These are rough guesses, not forecasts. The Manifold figures are from small markets that use play money, read in late October 2026; they move, and each market defines its event differently.

# Scenario Window Estimate Anchor
1 Your data shows up in a new breach 12 months 90%+ Record 3,322 US data compromises in 2025
2 Someone takes over one of your financial accounts 12 months 1–2% with good hygiene ~6 million US victims in 2025, up 18%; ~70% of victims in one survey had reused passwords
3 One of your institutions is down a day or more from an attack 18 months 5–10% 588 credit union cyber incidents reported May 2025–Apr 2026
4 That outage lasts two weeks or more 18 months 2–3% Patelco precedent
5 US banking disruption lasting days across many institutions 18 months 7–12% Manifold: 37% a $100B+ bank is hacked using AI in 2026; 17–23% AI knocks a national payment system offline 2+ hours by end of 2027
6 All of a person's separately-held accounts down at once for 2+ weeks 18 months 1–3% Judgment
7 Global internet disruption of 2+ hours Before 2028 About 45% Manifold, play money, about 35 participants (44% on 14 Nov 2026); counts accidental outages and an outage confined to China
8 Months of added friction: holds, in-person checks, restricted online features 18 months 30–50% Banks restricting outside AI assistants
9 Online finance broadly unusable for months 18 months 1–3% Judgment; no market prices this

Swing factor. Open-weight models catching up on cyber offense. Metaculus pro forecasters put about 95% on an open-weight model matching Mythos on a cyber benchmark before July 2027; hadad puts 85% on open-weights Mythos-level cyber capability within 24 months. If that happens, rows 5, 6, 8 and 9 move up.

Prediction markets. Polymarket and Kalshi had no relevant markets as of late October 2026; real-money platforms favor events with clean resolution criteria. Manifold uses play money, its markets are thin (the bank-hack market had 18 traders), and each defines its event differently.

Tripwires

These are the maintainer's own planning notes, not instructions. None of them is a reason to withdraw money because of a news headline. Stolen or leaked records, and the events on this site's news page, do not meet any of these signals. "Your bank has been hacked, move your money" is also the script of a common scam: no bank, agency or this site will ever tell you to move or withdraw money to keep it safe.

A signal only counts if the banks themselves or regulators confirm it.

Signal What the maintainer would consider
Banks you use, or several banks in your own country, have actually stopped card payments or withdrawals for more than a day, confirmed by the banks or regulators Check that the emergency cash and supplies you already planned for are in place; if they are, do nothing. Pay bills due soon; download your latest statements; treat every "your bank was affected, verify your account" message as a scam
An attack freezes a major bank or broker for more than a few days Review whether your day-to-day spending money sits at more than one institution
An ATM or card network is down for a day or more in your own area, confirmed by the operator Use the emergency cash you already hold; top up to your planned amount, and no more, once machines work again
Fraud guarantees start getting denied or stalled at scale Keep near-term money in bank accounts and on cards, where protections are legal rights rather than company discretion
A custodian or clearinghouse reports corrupted account records Refresh offline statements

Capital controls precedent. In June 2015 Greece closed its banks for three weeks and capped cash withdrawals at €60 a day from the first day. Limits on withdrawals, gradually loosened, lasted more than three years; limits on cash withdrawals inside Greece ended in October 2018. The driver was a debt crisis and fear of leaving the euro, not a cyberattack, and the Fed can supply dollars in a way Greece couldn't supply euros. It is not a guide to what a cyberattack would do.

Expert and institutional views

Considered and rejected

Idea Why not
Physical gold Only helps if the dollar system fails; useless for groceries in an outage; home insurance typically covers very little of it (about $200 is a common limit)
Choosing banks for deposit insurance Insurance covers failure, not hacked accounts
Crypto or self-custody Irreversible theft; individuals are weaker defenders than large custodians
A large cash pile Uninsured above ~$200; earns nothing; only covers a ~1–3% tail
A real-time news monitor Events needing same-day action are headline news; slow-moving changes don't need speed

Sources